Introduction
Traditionally, natural resources occurring on tribal lands within a reservation, including oil and gas resources, have been developed through a process of leasing. Under this process the.federal government would lease tribal oil and gas to non-Indian developers in the oil and gas industry, pursuant to the regulations set forth in 25 C.F.R. § 171 (1979),' under the terms of Form 5-157 (July, 1964) .2 Tribal involvement in this process was, also by tradition, passive if not submissive.
The minimal involvement of tribes in the development of their reservation resources stems from the federal government's purpose and rationale in selecting the leasing process to carry out its trust responsibility, i.e., to "make such changes in the management and disposition [of tribal property] as it deems necessary to promote their [tribal] welfare."' Leasing was originally applied to maintain or increase the "value" of tribal lands, which was considered diminished because of the inalienable status of trust or restricted lands. 4 It was also recognized that "mining depletes the *First-place winner, 1981 Indian Law Writing Competition. Third year law student, University of New Mexico.
1. See also Proposed Reg., 25 C.F.R. § 182, 45 Fed. Reg. 57,173 (Aug. 11, 1980), which emphasizes "contracting" over leasing of oil and gas resources.
2. Titled Oil and Gas Mining Lease for Tribal Indian Lands. The terms of the lease provide for, among other things, a 12 V2 % royalty on production, except for that used by the lessee, which has been increased in some recent leases to 162/%. It also provides for valuation of oil and gas based upon either the highest price paid or offered at the time of production, or calculated from the actual volume of marketable product less foreign substances; a 10-year primary term; and, "reasonable diligence" in development and operation, or in lieu of drilling, the payment of an amount not to exceed $1 per acre. See also 25 C.F.R. § 171.19 (1979) .
3. Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481, 485 (1925) . 4. Maintaining value by putting tribal mineral land to use is reflected by the following: "It has been customary for the Secretary under his general authority over Indian Affairs to make revocable permits on tribal lands which could not be leased under the statutes in order to preserve the value of the lands and to obtain a revenue from them rather than allowing them to lie idle." 1 Op. Sol. Dep't Interior 714, 715 (1937) .
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[Vol. 9 property rather than preserving its value." ' Nevertheless, the leasing of tribal mineral resources to nontribal developers was seized upon by the federal government not only for tribal benefit but also for the benefit of the government, the states, and the oil and gas industry. 6 For tribes, the principal benefit of the leasing process has been the royalty and rental income received. 7 These forms of income are free of production costs 8 and are free of state 9 and federal 0 taxation. Some tribes also have been able to expand and increase their benefits under the Form 5-157 lease by the incorporation of stipulations to the lease." In addition, the ease with which a tribe may enter into a lease and the minimal obligations a tribe must accept have attracted tribes wishing to develop tribal oil and gas to the passive role of lessor, especially where the tribe is in the initial stages of develojpment, or where the tribe does not possess the requisite technology or financial resources for development.
The problems tribes typically encounter under the leasing process generally arise from the limitations inherent in development through leasing. Once the lease is executed the terms of development are sealed; the tribe (and the mineral lessee) must live with 5. Id. 6. For instance, the legislative history of a leasing act lists some other purposes of leasing: "1. Permit the exploration for oil and gas on Executive Order Indian reservations. 2. Give the Indian tribes all the oil and gas royalties. 3. Authorize the States to tax production of oil and gas on such reservations. 4. Place with Congress the future determination of any changes of boundaries .... 5. Extend relief to permittees and applicants who in good faith expended money in development looking to the discovery of oil and gas.
." (S.Rept. No. 1240, at p.3; H.R. Rep. 1791, at p.3)" 2 Op. Sol. Dep't Interior 1921 , 1922 (1963 .
7. Such income includes income from bonus, and advance and minimum royalty provided for in the terms of the Form 5-157 lease, or stipulations to the lease.
8. Although such royalty may not be free of subsequent-to-production costs, e.g., costs of treatment of the product to make it marketable, or costs of transportation to market. See generally H. WILLIAMS 10. See Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55, 57. 11. Among the stipulated terms commonly incorporated into a lease are the following: (1) a five-year primary term; (2) royalty increased to 20 percent, plus a higher advanced rental amount; (3) inclusion of an "unless" clause; (4) a minimum royalty clause; (5) a water well conversion clause; (6) a grazing rights protection clause; (7) a preservation of antiquities clause; and (8) a clause requiring tribal approval of the drilling site location. the lease even though its royalty and rental provisions have waned in the presence of potential profit from decontrolled domestic oil or gas prices.' 2 This means that the tribe must live with its perception of "greener pastures." However, not withstanding the problem of inflexible terms under a lease, the real problem such a tribe must overcome is that of lease enforcement. Such enforcement does not lie within the province of the tribe but exists as a function of the Secretary of the Interior, through implementation by the United States Geological Survey. Unfortunately, this enforcement and the protection of tribal interests can be a heavy burden for the secretary and a disappointment for a tribe.
In Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp.,I 3 the court examined secretarial enforcement of and lessee compliance with the terms of lease Form 5-157."' In holding the secretary in breach of trust responsibility for failure to monitor the lessee's duty to diligently develop, failure to protect against drainage, and failure to require proper accounting from the lessee, 5 the court shifted the emphasis of responsibility for performance under the lease from compliance by the lessee to enforcement by the secretary. In such a case the relief sought by a tribe for breach of lease terms does not depend so much on whether there was compliance by the lessee but on whether there was enforcement by the secretary. Thus, any remedy available to a tribe for a lessee's breach of lease terms, for example, cancellation of leases, could be undermined by a finding of breach of trust responsibility by the secretary. The possible effect of such a determination is relief without substance-requiring the secretary to enforce leases that cannot be enforced.' 16. "The administration of oil and gas leases is normally performed by the Geological Survey. Like other federal agencies, its ability to take all possible actions to pursue every possible avenue in every situation is limited. It must balance its use of resources against possible benefits. At the present time, the Geological Survey would require a considerable increase in funding and personnel to accomplish the above evaluation for every
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For tribes wishing to develop oil and gas, or other reservation resources, leasing offers minimal involvement and responsibility for development, as well as limitations on tribal income and enforcement. In short, tribes have few alternatives under the leasing process. One alternative recommended by the court in Supron was the following:
I feel obligated to comment that the more appropriate remedy, were it available to the Tribe, would be the excision of the Secretary as the fiduciary through whom the Tribe is obligated to deal in its affairs with defendants-lessees. Plaintiff, like many other Tribes in recent times, has demonstrated its desire and ability to carry on business relations on its own, devoid of the paternalistic shroud in which it must be enveloped by the Secretary by virtue of the Tribe's legal status as a ward of the United States. It is Congress, however, and not the Court who is empowered to liberate the Indian Tribes from the protection imposed on them by the United States Government. 7 This alternative could prove useful to tribes if it were selectively applied, e.g., only to tribal resource or business development, and if it did not do away with the necessary incentives still needed by tribes.'" The problem that exists, however, is that Congress could take an "all or nothing" approach to "liberating" the tribes, which means termination. The view of the court may be well intended, but it fails to consider that termination has been tried and has been found to be a nonproductive enterprise. 19 Thus, another alternative needs to be found and considered.
An Alternative: Joint Development of Reservation Oil and Gas Resources
As illustrated in Supron, problems that arise from development based upon leasing often spring from the inherent adversary positions the parties must adopt in the lessor-lessee relationship. On the one hand, the oil and gas industry is attempting to adhere lease under its jurisdiction. The Geological Survey would, in effect, have to duplicate the technical staffs of the lessees to carry out this function fully." Davenport, Id. 18. See text accompanying notes 9, 10 supra.
to its standards of economical and efficient development; on the other hand, the tribe is attempting to enforce its lease to ensure maximum development and income under the terms of the lease. The benefits that accrue for one party are often seen as exclusive in relationship to the benefits that accrue for the other party, i.e., a gain by one party is considered a loss by the other party. 2 " An effective and efficient alternative to leasing must operate to eliminate or greatly reduce the adversary relationship between the tribe and the oil and gas industry, that is, tribal oil and gas resources must be developed for mutual, not mutually exclusive, benefit. Although movement away from federal leasing implies development by a tribe in its individual capacity, this may not be the case. For strict self-development to occur a tribe must be willing to tie up its limited funds in the acquisition of petroleum technology, equipment, and expertise not possessed by the tribe. Such an extensive diversion of limited tribal funds from the governmental, social, and community programs of the tribe to a program of exploration and development would be far beyond the capabilities of most tribes. The high costs involved in the location and drilling of wells could quickly bankrupt even the most affluent tribes: drilling costs alone can range from $400,000 to $1.5 million per well, depending upon the depth, the geology encountered, the need for directional drilling, etc. Thus, for tribes planning to develop under a program of strictly individual tribal development, the tribe should be prepared to develop more slowly and to accept substantial sacrifice.
Many of the obstacles encountered in strict self-development could be reduced or eliminated by joining with the oil and gas industry in developing tribal resources for mutual benefit. Under such a program of joint development each party could provide 20. "I believe it can fairly be said that the mistrust and suspicion on the part of both the Indian and non-Indian parties to lease negotiations constitute a significant obstacle to the development of natural resources of Indian lands by the private sector. Indians have on occasion expressed the sentiment that the white man has cheated the Indian for generations and that the present crop of industry representatives are attempting to separate the Indian from his natural resources at less than a fair price. Industry reacts to such charges with amazement and chagrin, conceding that while Robber Barons may have taken advantage of Indians 100 years ago, industry today is acting generously and in good faith and feels the Indians should not take out their resentment for ancient wrongs on the present management. The conclusion often reached is that no matter what kind of deal is offered to the Indians, they will never be satisfied." Ferguson, Industry Problems With that which the other does not possess. The tribe could provide the proven or suspected oil and gas in place which would be clear in title and free of encumbrance, and the industry could provide the equipment, technology, expertise, and money required to extract the reservation resource from the land. The problem that arises under this mutual or joint approach to development concerns the difference in value between each party's "contribution" to the development effort. The industry, by providing all or most all of the money, hardware, and know-how, could find itself in a much less favorable position under joint development than under leasing. Thus, a tribe must be able to provide more than unencumbered oil and gas, which is no more than it provides in a leasing situation, if it wishes to achieve its developmental goals.
Nontaxable Status as an Aid to Tribal Self-Development
The only attribute posessed by a tribe that could substantially increase its bargaining position with respect to joint development with the oil and gas industry is its nontaxable status"' under the Internal Revenue Code. 2 This status directly affects a tribe's economic position by not diminishing tribal profits or income through the burden of federal income taxation. In addition, the possibility exists that a tribe could structure its joint development arrangement with the oil and gas developer in a manner that would allow the developer to utilize certain tax benefits not available to the tribe, while allowing the tribe to increase its income and control over reservation oil and gas development. This possibility has been suggested by one commentator:
Indian tribes are exempt from federal income taxation as well as state income and resource taxes. As a result, any energy company contemplating the exploitation of reservation resources should consider the advantages of a project format that would allow the company to share a portion of available tax savings. Substantial tax savings can be achieved through careful structuring of the venture to spread the tax exempt tribal immunity over all or part of the project. As an alternative, a project can be structured under the tax exempt status so the [Vol. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol9/iss1/7 NOTES taxable partner has a disproportionate percentage of the operation's federal and state tax write-offs. 23 If the commentator's unsupported assertions are valid, a tribe's nontaxable status could provide the basis for a tribal program of development that would benefit all parties. These benefits could take the following form:
(1) the promotion of tribal responsibility for self-government through the use of nontribal technology and funding in the exploration and development of reservation resources, and the accomplishment of the tribal goals of increasing control over reservation development, thus maximizing income from development and minimizing impact on the tribal environment and culture; 2 (2) the creation of a favorable federal income tax environment for oil and gas developers and investors; and, (3) the reduction of federal financial and oversight responsibility for tribal support and development. The overall effect of such a nontaxation-based program of development would be a tribe's acceptance of responsibility for its own growth, development, and economic security, and a shifting of some of the financial and developmental burden from the federal government to the private sector.
Notwithstanding the general attractiveness of a nontaxationbased joint development program, before such a program could be initiated several basic issues need to be examined to determine whether it is a conceptually practical alternative. To make this determination, the following must be considered: (a) whether a tribe truly exists as a nontaxable entity, and, if it does, (b) whether a tribe's nontaxable status could be used to achieve its development goals or objectives, and, if it can, (c) in what manner could the tribe's nontaxable status be applied to accomplish the beneficial results sought by a joint development program. nor their property, real or personal, ever be liable to taxes of any kind . . .' he finds it missing." ' 2 1 This apparent absence of express, unambiguous authority upon which Indian nontaxable or tax-exempt status can be based has created some confusion as to the tax status of individual Indians and tribes. This examination does not concern the federal tax status of individual Indians, who are subject to federal income taxation, 2 6 unless exempted by treaty, agreement, or act of Congress, 7 or unless their income is derived directly from restricted allotted land held in trust by the United States." In addition, this inquiry does not concern the taxation of tribes by the state. 29 The focus of this examination rests solely upon a tribe's status in relation to the Internal Revenue Code.
Nontaxation of Tribes Under Federal Income Tax Law
Authority for Tribal Nontaxibility
The sole express authority for the proposition that Indian tribes are not subject to the income tax provisions of the Code exists in 27. "We agree with the Government that Indians are citizens and that in ordinary affairs of life, not governed by treaties or remedial legislation, they are subject to the payment of income taxes as are other citizens . . . . But we cannot agree that taxability of respondents in these circumstances is unaffected by the treaty, the trust patent or the Allotment Act. 29. See supra note 9, which recites the basis for exemption of tribal royalty and production income from state taxation. See also Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) , where a tribal off-reservation ski business located on lands acquired in trust, under 25 U.S.C. § 465, and exempt from state taxation, was held not exempt from a nondiscriminatory gross receipts tax when the Court stated that it would "not imply an ex- Notwithstanding the clarity and generality of the revenue ruling, tribes and individuals who wish to rely upon the ruling should realize that revenue rulings are "limited in scope by the pivotal facts stated in the Revenue Ruling," ' 32 and should not be relied upon "unless the facts and circumstances are substantially the same." 33 In Revenue Ruling 67-284, no facts or circumstances were presented; thus, the statement should be considered as a conclusion of law and statement of policy by the Internal Revenue Service. The ruling does not define "tribe" within the application of the ruling. Such an omission is not unusual because "[n]either Congress nor the Executive Branch has prescribed any standardized definition for either the term 'Indian' or 'Indian tribe' in terms of the special federal relationships with Indians." 34 The concept of "tribe" has been narrowed in certain situations: "federal jurisdiction to authorize or secure immunities [from state, and possibly federal law] . . . does not exist except with respect to persons or entities which are 'Indians' or 'Indian Tribes,' respectively, in the political sense as acknowledged by the United States." ' 3 Thus, the term "tribe" in the ruling could, and probably does, refer to a tribe in the "political sense" which would mean it applies to the tribe as a government or to the governmental body of the tribe. The effect of applying such a definition to a joint development program would be that the tribal government, and not a separate tribal organization or group, must be the entity involved in the development of reservation resources. Otherwise tribal development could fall beyond the ambit of nontaxability under Revenue Ruling 67-284.
Finally, individuals or tribes planning to rely upon the ruling should be cognizant of the actual tribal tax status recognized by the Service. Some commentators have described tribes as being "exempt from federal income taxation," ' 36 
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Revenue Ruling 67-284 as an "exemption from taxation by the national government." 7 These characterizations of tribal tax status as based upon some form of "exemption from taxation" have not accurately construed the language of the ruling. "Exemption from taxation" has been defined by one source as follows:
In the broad sense, all property not taxed; in a narrower sense, the grant of immunity, express or implied, to particular persons or corporations, or to persons or corporations of a particular class, from a tax upon property or an excise which persons and corporations generally within the same taxing district are obliged to pay. 8
Any characterization based upon an "exemption from taxation" would imply (1) that a tribe was subject to taxation, and (2) that all or a portion of the tribe or its income has been rendered immune from taxation by a statutory grant, whether express or implied. Such an interpretation does not follow the language of the ruling. The ruling states in clear and express language that tribes are not subject to the income tax statutes and that they are not "taxable entities." This means that tribes are not "tax exempt" but are "nontaxable," i.e., tribes never were and are not now subject to any of the provisions of the Code. The importance of this distinction rests upon the effect of tax exemptions: such exemptions are generally narrow in scope and application, 39 and because tax exemptions are based upon a grant of immunity their existence is more tenuous, being subject to modification or extinguishment by the granting body or the courts."' On the other hand, the status of federal "nontaxation" broadly extends to all tribes existing as federally recognized political entities, and it is not limited by statute or decree. In fact, the existence of such a nontaxable status, as indicated below, stems from the absence of any statutory authority to the contrary. [Vol. 9
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NOTES A Foundation for the Internal Revenue Service Ruling of Tribal Nontaxability Under the Internal Revenue Code
Revenue Ruling 67-284 represents an official interpretation of federal tax law and policy by the IRS. 4 ' However, the absence of supporting analysis within the ruling has created some confusion or uneasiness among individuals and tribes who have relied or are planning to rely upon its conclusion of tribal nontaxability. Thus, an analysis of the federal Indian law applicable to tribes could serve to clarify the foundation upon which the ruling was based.
The ruling's conclusion of tribal nontaxability springs from and is consistent with the concept of tribal sovereignty and the rules of construction applicable to tribes. In Worcester v. Georgia, 42 the Court enunciated the basis for the sovereign status of tribes in relation to the federal government:
From the commencement of our government, Congress has passed acts to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate. All these acts . . . manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guarantied by the United States..
. The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people distinct from others." The Constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently, admits their rank among those powers who are capable of making treaties. The words "treaty" and "nation," are words of our own language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well-understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are applied in the same sense. Thus, in a hierarchy of sovereign entities a tribe is more than a state but less than the United States.
Tribes possess all of the attributes of local self-government, but when exercising tribal functions and authority all such rights are "subject to the supreme legislative authority of the United States."1 4 7 Or, as also stated by the Court, "Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local selfgovernment which the tribes otherwise possess." ' 4 8 Prior to the passage of the Indian Appropriation Act of March 3, 1871, 49 Congress defined its relationships with Indian tribes by treaties, but with the Act Congress terminated treaty-making with Indian tribes. The effect of this end to treaty-making has been described as follows: be definitely expressed, where, as here, the general language of the Act laying the tax is broad enough to include the subject matter. 5 Although "express" congressional intent is required to exclude a tribe from the application of a general act of Congress, thus creating a tribal immunity, it is also required to extinguish a tribal immunity or right. Thus, confusion often remains where a tribe is not expressly excluded from a general act and also is not expressly stripped of its rights or immunities.
In such a situation, where conflict exists between traditional rules of construction, the courts and administrative agencies have examined the scope of a statute of general applicability in the context of (1) the federal trust responsibility, and (2) the effect on tribal sovereignty. The application of general acts of Congress to tribes or individual Indians has been allowed where the application did not breach the trust responsibility of the United States nor affect the sovereignty of the tribe within the boundaries of the reservation.", On the other hand, the application of such general statutes or acts has not been allowed where the application would breach or erode federal trust responsibility or infringe upon the sovereignty of tribal government.
7 Thus, as a general 145 (1973) , the Court held that a business enterprise operated outside of the reservation was subject to the state's general gross receipts tax; (2) in FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1970), the Court held that nontrust fee land owned by the tribe was subject to the federal eminent domain power and could be condemned by a federal agency; (3) in Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, 288 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1961), the court held that a non-Indian employer operating on the reservation was subject to the National Labor Relations Act, but that the Act had a doubtful effect on the tribe; and (4) in Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 691 (1930), held that income derived from trust income and distributed to an individual Indian not under federal trust protection, was subject to federal income taxation.
57. E.g., The application of general statutes or acts have not been allowed in the following circumstances: (1) In Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) , the Court held that off-reservation land held in trust was not subject to the general property tax of the state; (2) in FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1970), the Court indicated that application of federal eminent domain powers did "not breach the faith of the United States, or any treaty or other contractual agreement" because the lands were nontrust fee lands; (3) in Fort Apache Timber Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 503 (1976), the National Labor Relations Board held that the sovereign status of a tribal government over its affairs within the reservation excluded it from the definition of "employer" under the N.L.R.A.; and (4) in Stevens v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1971), the Court held that income derived directly from land held in trust solely for the benefit of an individual Indian was not subject to federal income tax.
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NOTES rule, where application of a statute of "general applicability" would infringe upon the sovereignty of tribal government within the reservation, or would extinguish or erode the rights or immunities of the tribe or its members, such an application would require a clear manifestation or expression from Congress that such action was intended.
Therefore, in order to subject a sovereign tribe protected under the trust responsibility of the federal government to the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, and thus make the tribe subject to the burden of taxation, application of the general rule would require a clear, unambiguous expression or manifestation from Congress that such action was intended. No such congressional manifestation or expression exists." Thus, the conclusion of the Service in Revenue Ruling 67-284, that "[lincome tax statutes do not tax Indian tribes [, and that t]he tribe is not a taxable entity," 5 9 is valid and correct.
Tribal Use of the Federal Nontaxable Status in Tribe-Owned Reservation Enterprises
Accepting the validity and scope of tribal nontaxation for 58. Notwithstanding the absence of express or manifest congressional intent to subject tribes to federal income taxation, the enactment of the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 4991(b)(2), § 4994(d), 94 Stat. 229, has blurred the "nontaxable" status of tribes which "produce" oil from trust and restricted mineral interests by expressly exempting federally recognized tribes from "windfall profit" taxation. This blurred view of the tribal tax-free status is reflected in the following: "The House did not specifically exempt oil produced by Federally recognized Indian tribes. However, various court decisions and Internal Revenue Service rulings hold income from Tribal Trust Lands to be exempt from income tax in the absence of a clear Congressional intention to impose a tax. Thus, it is unclear whether the courts and Internal Revenue Service would interpret the House bill as taxing tribal trust oil production." S. REP. No. 394, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 61 (1979). The "court decisions and [IRS] rulings" referred to in the report appear to be those involving a tribal member's receipt of a share of income or royalty from tribal leases or agreements. E.g., Blackbird v. Commissioner, 38 F.2d 976 (10th Cir. 1930); Rev. Rul. 58-320, 1958-1 C.B. 24. Congress could have relied upon or incorporated by reference Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55, to maintain the clarity of a tribe's federal nontaxable status if it wished tribes to remain wholly nontaxable under the IRC. But, by expressly including tribes within the application of the windfall profit tax Congress has undermined and blurred the conclusion of Rev. Rul. 67-284, thus making it less reliable than before passage of the Act. For a narrow portion of their income, tribes are currently subject to taxation with an exemption granted for such income derived from mineral interests held in trust or restricted status and in which the tribe has an "economic interest" on Jan. 21 60 the state tax exemption of a tribe was examined in the context of the tribal power to impose a cigarette sales tax upon non-Indians within the reservation and the tribal preemption of concurrent state taxation. In holding that the state of Washington could impose its tax on cigarette purchases by nontribal individuals, the Court discussed some limitations on the tribal use of its state tax exemption:
It is painfully apparent that the value marketed by the smokeshops to persons coming from outside is not generated on the reservations by activities in which the Tribes have a significant interest. [Citations omitted.] What the smokeshops offer these customers, and what is not available elsewhere, is solely an exemption from state taxation. The Tribes assert the power to create such exemptions by imposing their own taxes or otherwise earning revenues by participating in the reservation enterprises. If this assertion were accepted, the Tribes could impose a nominal tax and open chains of discount stores at reservation borders, selling goods of all descriptions at deep discounts and drawing custom from surrounding areas. We do not believe that principles of federal Indian law, whether stated in terms of pre-emption, tribal self-government, or otherwise, authorize Indian tribes thus to market an exemption from state taxation to persons who would normally do their business elsewhere. 6 ' The clear concern of the Court was the possible "marketing" of a state tax exemption by the tribe in order to create an unfair advantage for a reservation business over nonreservation businesses. But of apparent greater concern to the Court was the mechanism employed by the tribe to encourage tribal business enterprises-the preemption of all state taxation on a transaction which the state was authorized to tax, 62 thus allowing the nontribal customers to purchase the product free of any state tax levy. Although such a situation could not occur under an oil and gas joint development program for federal income tax purposes, [Vol. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol9/iss1/7 NOTES the question remains whether a tribe can use its federal nontaxable status to promote its development goals under the Court's rationale in Colville. An examination of the Court's rationale should serve as an answer to this issue.
Setting aside the disparate foundations in law for tribal state tax exemptions and tribal federal nontaxation, and focusing on the Court's rationale, a "general rule" for tribal use of its taxfree status can be constructed. This "rule" derived from the language of the Court, could take the form of the following: If the "value" of a product sold to nontribal individuals on a reservation is derived solely from a tax-exempt (or nontaxable) tribal status, and is not produced or generated on the reservation by activities in which a tribe has a significant interest, then a tribe does not have the authority to employ such a tax-free status to create a commercial advantage for tribal business over nontribal business.
An application of this "rule" to a joint oil and gas development program makes apparent a significant difference between the tribe's use of its tax-exempt status in Colville and the use of the tribal nontaxable status in the program, i.e., no competitive business advantage is sought nor would be realized by the tribe as a result of the program. The tribe's development of its oil and gas would not be at the expense or detriment of others in the oil and gas industry, but would be more in the form of cooperation with the industry. The only advantages that could be realized by the tribe would be an achievement of the tribal goals of increased control and income from development and a decreased impact on the tribal culture and environment.
As indicated by the "rule," the Court considered two elements essential in determining whether the tribe's use of its tax-exempt (or nontaxable) status was allowable: (1) the sole reason for transacting business with the tribe was based upon a shift of tax-free status from the tribe to the nontribal participant, and (2) the subject of the transaction was produced or generated on the reservation by activities in which the tribe had a significant interest. Applying these criteria to the joint development program indicates that the "rule" in Colville would not disallow a tribe's use of its federal nontaxable status for such development purposes. First, the tribe could not shift its nontaxable status to the nontribal participant. The tribe in Colville was able to attempt such a shift because of its conceptually "higher level" of sovereignty 6 3 which 63 . See text accompanying note 46, supra.
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allowed it to claim that state taxes or laws had been preempted by tribal law1 4 or federal law. 6 " But, no such claim can be made against the federal government whose sovereignty exceeds that of the tribe. Moreover, any "shifts" that would occur between the participants in the joint development program would be only those allowed under the Internal Revenue Code, and any effect on the nontribal participant should not be violative of the Code. Second, the subject matter of the transaction, the oil and gas in place under the reservation, exists as a vital interest of the tribe, which is reflected in the desire of most tribes to become actively involved in the actual production of their reservation resource. Thus, under the criteria expressed in Colville, a tribe's use of its nontaxable status should be allowed.
Though remote, another possible limitation could exist on a tribe's use of its federal nontaxable status under the guise of the "overriding federal interest" doctrine. This doctrine, which was discussed in Colville," was described in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe as follows: "Upon incorporation into the territory of the United States, the Indian tribes thereby come under the territorial sovereignty of the United States and their exercise of separate power is constrained so as not to conflict with the interests of this overriding sovereignty.' '67 Under this doctrine one could argue that a tribe's use of its nontaxable status impinges upon the United States' sovereign right to levy its income tax under the IRC by reducing the lawful tax owed by the nontribal participants. Proponents of such an argument would have to show that when tribes submitted to the overriding sovereignty of the United States they also surrendered their right to enter into any agreements that might affect federal taxation, even though the tax liability and the decisions affecting such liability are the sole responsibility of the taxpayer and are beyond the power of the tribe. Such an argument would have greater impact if the tribe's use of its nontaxable status totally removed the possibility of tax liability, rather than just possibly affecting such liability. [Vol. 9 https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol9/iss1/7
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The effect, if any, of a tribe's nontaxable status occurs as a result of its primary concern for the development of reservation resources. It would in no way affect the right of the United States to impose or enforce its income tax upon its citizens. In actuality, there appears to be little or no possibility that a tribe's tax status, in the context of reservation development, could frustrate the federal interest in obtaining revenue.
Although a judicial review would probably be necessary to resolve this question, the possibility clearly exists that a tribe's use of its federal nontaxable status as a means of achieving its developmental goals or objectives would not run afoul of a rule such as the one presented in Colville, and that it should not tread upon an overriding federal interest. Such use exists as only one factor among many that a tribe must consider if it is to accept and increase its responsibility for the development of reservation resources. Because such use could be of substantial benefit to a tribe and the nontribal participants, however, it would be in the best interest of both to seek some form of clarification upon which they could rely before implementing the development project. Thus, a tribe, in the context of a joint development program, should seek a ruling from the Service as to the status of such a program for federal income tax purposes."
Effect of a Tribe's Nontaxable Status on a Joint Development Program of Reservation Oil and Gas Resources
Notwithstanding the fact that whether a tribe can use its federal nontaxable status within the context of reservation resource development remains a question to be clarified by the courts or Congress, but accepting the possibility that such use would not be found objectionable, the question remaining is in what manner, if any, could a tribe employ its status of nontaxability to accomplish the beneficial effects sought by a joint program for the development of tribal oil and gas?" An attempt to answer this question involves the examination of two interlocking issues:
(1) what kind of structure should a joint development program adopt that would take into account a tribe's federal nontaxable status, and (2) what would be the possible effect of such a structure on the tribal and the nontribal participants?
To premise such an examination, several basic and unalterable 
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principles should be considered. First, even though tribes are not subject to the provisions of the IRC, 7° nontribal participants are subject to and governed by its provisions; thus the structure of the joint development program must necessarily comply with the provisions of the Code and applicable case law. Second, participant-taxpayers have the right to decrease the amount of their tax liability or altogether avoid such liability by any lawful means, 7 and they are generally free to structure their business affairs to be in the their best interests, including the lawful structuring of their affairs to minimize their tax burden." Third, the burden of the participants' tax liability is dependent upon the substance, not the form, of their transaction,"' which means that the form selected for a transaction must have economic reality" and not exist as a mere sham.1 5 Thus, an examination of the structures available to a joint development program not only must focus on potential benefits but also must ensure that such structures are firmly grounded in economic substance under the federal tax laws.
The Structure of a Joint Development Program
The range of structures that could be employed by a tribe in a joint program for development are limited because such structures must be consistent with and maintain a tribe's sovereign status, allow a flexible relationship to exist between the parties, and provide maximum tax advantages to the nontribal participants. These minimum basic requirements would exclude the traditional corporate structure for the following reasons: (1) tribal sovereignty would be undermined because a tribe, to the extent of its involvement in the corporation, would have to submit to the jurisdiction of the state that granted the charter of incorporation; 7 " (2) a tribe would indirectly render its income subject ( § 55) , and maintain an office and agent within the state ( § 12) for service of process ( § 14) . Note: Even if the tribe enacted its own incorporation laws, the state could probably retain at least concurrent [Vol. 9
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NOTES to federal income taxation," while the nontribal participants would be subject to double taxation; 78 and, (3) a corporate form of structure would offer little flexibility to the parties to adjust for changing circumstances." Almost the same reasons would exclude a Subchapter S corporation as a possible joint development structure. 80 At the opposite end of the range of possible structures is the joint venture. 8 1 This form of structure would offer the flexibility required by the parties and would not submit the tribe to the jurisdiction of the state. For the purpose of federal income taxation, a joint venture is included within the definition of "partnership" 82 and is governed by the provisions of Subchapter K. 3 Under these provisions, partners are individually liable for their income tax. 84 Each partner is required to take into account its "distributive share" of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit, whether or not distributed to it, in order to determine tax liability. 85 What consti- 81. "The legal relationship known as a joint venture has been defined as a 'special combination of two or more persons, where in some specific venture a profit is jointly sought without any actual partnership or corporate designation,' and also as 'an association of persons to carry out a single business enterprise for profit.' " Beck Chem. Equip. Corp. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 840, 848-49 (1957).
82. "Partnership" includes "a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization through ... which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on .... tutes a partner's distributive share of a joint venture is determined either by the provisions of the joint venture agreement, 8 6 or by the proportionate interest in the joint venture owned by the partner where the agreement is silent as to the partner's distributive share, or where a special allocation of income, gain, loss, etc., in the agreement lacks "substantial economic effect." 87 Because each partner is taxed individually, use of the joint venture form of structure would allow a tribe to retain wholly the federal nontaxability of its distributive share of joint venture income. It could also allow a nontribal participant lawfully to decrease his tax liability by means of "special allocations" authorized under the joint venture agreement, which could have a "substantial economic effect." 8 8 It is through such allocations in the agreement that the tribe and the nontribal participants would attempt to shift the benefits and burdens of the joint venture for their mutual benefit.
The Effects of Structure: Limitations Encountered in a Joint Development Program Employing a Traditional Joint Venture Form Section 704(b)(2) special allocations under the test for"substantial economic effect"
Other than some incipient difficulties facing the development of trust property, 8 9 one of the initial questions with which a joint development program must contend is whether the special allocation made pursuant to the joint venture agreement exerts a "sub- 88. Income Tax Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) describes "substantial economic effect in the following: "whether an allocation has 'substantial economic effect,' that is, whether the allocation may actually affect the dollar amount of partners' shares of the total partnership income or loss independently of tax consequences ......
89. The Office of the Solicitor, Department of Interior, has expressed its view in an undocumented opinion that, under current law, the Secretary of the Interior does not possess the authority to approve partnership-joint venture agreements which vest an economic interest in trust property in nontribal or non-Indian individuals or organizations. Notwithstanding numerous secretarial approvals of such agreements prior to this opinion, the Department of Interior has proposed legislation to remedy this technical oversight. Interview with Phillip S. Deloria, Director, American Indian Law Center (formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary, Indian Affairs), in Albuquerque, N.M. (Feb. 13, 1981) . This "problem" should be easily overcome by a contribution of a leasehold interest in trust property rather than of trust property itself.
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https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol9/iss1/7 NOTES stantial economic effect" 9 and applies to all special allocations, i.e., allocations that vary from the general allocation of profit and loss in the joint venture, 91 and which are expressed, orally or in writing, in the original agreement or in a modification to the agreement. 92 What constitutes the elements or substance of the test has been slow in evolution and the subject of much commentary. 93 The Service has provided little guidance as to the substance or scope of the test 9 4 beyond the description provided in the regulations, '9 5 which one commentator has interpreted as follows:
90. The "substantial economic effect" test was added to I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) by the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Prior to its codification it was the principal test employed to determine if an allocation's "principal purpose" was the "avoidance or evasion" of a tax, which was the previous § 704(b)(2) standard. Early decisions involving special allocations either did not provide an analysis of substantial economic effect, 97 or resolved the issue without reference to the test, e.g., finding the allocation more closely resembled a "loan" rather than "a true modification or readjustment of the partner's distributive shares .... ."" The form of analysis presently employed by the courts and the Service to determine substantial economic effect involves an examination of the effect of the special allocation on the capital account 9 9 of the partner receiving the allocation. The framework for this analysis was established by the court in Orrisch v. Commissioner, 0 0 when it announced the following principles for determining the existence of a substantial economic effect: (1) as a general rule, the economic burden created by a special allocation must be borne by the party receiving the allocation, and to reflect this burden, the special allocation must operate to increase or decrease the capital account of the party receiving the allocation;' ' (2) such a party's capital account should be adjusted to account for any disparity between partners' accounts either by making a contribution to the partnership, or by proportionately reducing his share of partnership assets at liquidation of the partnership;1 02 and, (3) partners cannot use "prospective tax benefits 96 [Vol. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol9/iss1/7 NOTES *.. as the medium for equalizing their investments," 0 3 i.e., their capital accounts. The court applied these principles and found that the special allocation did not "actually affect the dollar amount of the partner's shares of the total partnership income or loss independently of tax consequences," and thus did not have substantial economic effect within the meaning of Regulation § 1.704-(b)(2).
The basic analysis of Orrisch was applied in Harris v. Commissioner, 0 4 which affirmed the substantial economic effect of an "arm's-length" transaction in which all of the parties wished to "clearly delineate" their respective tax burdens, and which resulted in an "exact equivalence between the amount of loss and the economic effect as among the partners. . .. '" ' In Magaziner v. Commissioner,' 6 the court reaffirmed and simplified the Orrisch capital account analysis when it announced:
In other words, the partner who benefits from a special allocation of tax deductions must bear the entire economic cost [burden] of such deductions. Accordingly, if the allocation of an item of income or deduction to a partner is reflected in his capital account and the liquidation proceeds of the entity are distributed in accordance with the capital accounts, the allocation has substantial economic effect.' 0 7
The language of the court approving a special allocation resulting in "exact equivalence" or requiring a special allocation recipient to "bear the entire economic cost [burden]" of the allocation, has apparently spurred the Service to adopt the view that a special allocation must exert a dollar-for-dollar economic effect on the capital accounts at liquidation of a joint venture in order to have a "substantial economic effect."' 0 8 This view, which has been the subject of commentary and criticism,'°9 appears to be a move away from the concept of substantial economic effect ex-siderable difficulty in creating a favorable federal income tax environment for the nontribal participant.
In the context of a traditional joint venture structure the federal nontaxable status of a tribe does not appear to provide any aid to the nontribal participant. For instance, some special allocations under the Code cannot be made by a tribe. Because a tribe exists as a nontaxable entity it does not have many of the attributes of a taxable entity that could be allocated to a nontribal participant, i.e., the tribe has no deductions or credits that could be allocated because such items only exist under the Code. ' 29 The tribe could allocate income or profit from a joint venture activity, but an allocation or shift of those items would not further the joint development goals of either party. 3 ' The only item a tribe could allocate would be an "economic loss" suffered by the tribe within the joint venture. Under the Orrisch line of cases and rulings, such special allocation would require the nontribal participant to bear the entire economic burden (cost) of the allocation by reducing its capital account and its share of liquidation proceeds. This form of special allocation is not uncommon in joint venture agreements, although it is usually accompanied by a provision that would allow the nontribal participant to recoup such losses in subsequent years,' 3 ' thus allowing the participant to enjoy the advantage of currently deductible losses (to the extent allowed by the amount at risk). Nevertheless, because the tribe has no "paper" deductions or credits it could allocate (depreciation, depletion, or investment credit) and could only shift the burden of its economic losses, its nontaxable status does not appear useful as a means of encouraging nontribal participants and investors to enter into traditional joint venture based programs with the tribe.
The result does not appear different when applied to any other provisions of the Code, e.g., "at risk" provisions of IRC § 465. Because the Code, as recently amended, has centered its attention on restricting the taxable activities of the individual, it has created 129. Cf. Snell v. Commissioner, 10 B.T.A. 1081 (1928) (individual Indian wishing to offset taxable income from other sources was denied a deduction for depletion because of the tax-exempt status of the depletable property; the purpose for allowing deductions does not exist where the party is not subject to federal income taxation). 
NOTES
for any permanent capital improvements made on the leased property. 5 0 If a tribe wished to retain depreciation and investment credit in order to increase the "value" of its development package, then it could take remedial action in the form of an equipment leasing joint venture. Such an enterprise should not be subject to the restrictions applicable to the development of trust property.' 5 ' To minimize the adverse effects of the Code on the joint venture, the tribe should seek only corporations" as participants so that investment credit could either be passed on to the lesseq or retained by the corporate participant."' The tribe could provide, in the joint venture agreement, for tribal use of the equipment, and for subsequent purchase of used equipment for use in its own development.
The effect of a tribe's use of prepackaged development projects should be beneficial for all parties. The tribe would realize a greatly increased share of production and rental income, and it could control development of oil and gas within the reservation through careful project planning. The lessee-participant would realize depletable production and income, and would also have current deductions for rental payments on the equipment, as well as any pass-through of investment credit. The nontribal joint venture participant could have its distributional share of profit, loss, depreciation, interest expense, and investment credit, if not passed on to the lessee.
Conclusion
Although tribes may possess substantial oil or other resources within the reservation, they are not using such resources in their best interests until they take an active role in the development of those resources. In order to assume this role, tribes must be aware of the development alternatives available to them and what effect these alternatives would have on both the tribe and the oil and gas industry. This means that a tribe should include some form of tax planning in their selection of a development alternative. I 3 Such planning is commonly employed in the oil and gas 
